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Dodd‐Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison

Abstract
The Dodd‐Frank financial reform legislation creates an “Or‐
derly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) that shares many features
in common with the Bankruptcy Code. This is easy to overlook
because the legislation uses a language and employs a deci‐
sionmaker (both borrowed from bank regulation) that will
seem foreign to bankruptcy lawyers. Our task in this essay is to
identify the core congruities between OLA and the Code. In
doing so, we highlight important differences and assess both
their constitutionality and policy objectives. We conclude with
a few thoughts on the likelihood that OLA will contribute to
market stability.
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Dodd‐Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers
Douglas G. Baird† and Edward R. Morrison‡
The recently enacted financial reform legislation empowers the Sec‐
retary of the Treasury to appoint the FDIC as receiver for troubled fi‐
nancial companies when their failure poses a systemic risk. Previously,
the resolution process for these companies was left to the bankruptcy
process. By common account, the new law reflects a repudiation of tra‐
ditional bankruptcy law when it comes to the collapse of giant corpora‐
tions that threaten the economy as a whole.1 Instead we have a mecha‐
nism that brings the regime used to liquidate failed commercial banks to
a broader range of institutions. Perhaps the only consolation for parti‐
sans of traditional bankruptcy law is a mandate for future studies as‐
sessing “the effectiveness of chapter 7 and chapter 11 … in facilitating
the orderly resolution or reorganization of systemic financial institu‐
tions.”2
But this view is mistaken. Far from reflecting a rejection of bank‐
ruptcy principles, quite the opposite is true. First, the legislation re‐
moves bankruptcy court jurisdiction from only a narrow range of
cases—“financial companies” whose failure is sufficiently threatening to
market stability. The vast majority of giant businesses, including sys‐
temically important ones (i.e., the General Motors of the next great re‐
cession), are not “financial companies” within the meaning of Title II
and remain squarely in the province of bankruptcy law. Moreover, the
mechanics of the new receivership process incorporate basic bankruptcy
principles. They effectively permit reorganization as well as liquidation,
debtor‐in‐possession financing, asset sales free and clear of existing
Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago Law School. We thank Thomas Merrill, Gillian Metzger, Harvey
Miller, Henry Monaghan, Daniel Rossner, and Adam Samaha for their help.
The John M. Olin Fund, the Microsoft Fund, and the Milton and Miriam Han‐
dler Foundation provided research support.
‡ Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law & Economics, Columbia Law School.
1 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte and David Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 35 J.
Corp. L. 469 (2010); Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate
Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82
Temp. L. Rev. 449 (2009).
2 See §216(a)(2)(A).
†
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liens, claw‐back of prepetition fraudulent and preferential transfers, and
safe harbors for financial contracts.
Nevertheless, aspects of the receivership process will at first seem
alien to bankruptcy lawyers. The necessity for government intervention
and the adaptation of a mechanism used for failed banks introduces
new terminology and, more importantly, a new decisionmaker. While
traditional bankruptcy law reflects a balance of power in which the
debtor in possession (DIP), the creditors’ committee, the DIP lender, and
the bankruptcy judge play discrete roles, this regime concentrates
power in a single entity, the FDIC.
The almost complete absence of a judge is especially striking. In the
rare cases in which it is invoked, Title II replaces the bankruptcy judge
with the FDIC. The FDIC’s powers in this new domain largely track its
longstanding powers with respect to commercial banks under the Fed‐
eral Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). As receiver, the FDIC is vested with
“all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the covered financial com‐
pany” and may “operate the covered financial company with all the
powers of the members or shareholder, the directors, and the officers.”3
It also has the power to make postpetition loans.4
Although Title II emphasizes that “the purpose of this title [is] to
provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial compa‐
nies,”5 the concept of “liquidation” here is a very broad one. It encom‐
passes not just piecemeal liquidation. The FDIC’s powers include the
right to sell substantially all of the institution’s assets to another com‐
pany, “without obtaining any approval, assignment, or consent with
respect to such transfer,” unless the sale raises antitrust or related con‐
cerns.6 The FDIC’s powers also include (implicitly) the ability to reor‐
ganize the failing institution by transferring selected assets and claims
to a “bridge financial company” that is owned, controlled, and poten‐
tially capitalized by the FDIC.7 The FDIC can run this bridge company
§210(a)(1)(A)(i), 210(a)(1)(B)(i). In exercising these rights, the FDIC is au‐
thorized to continue employing existing directors and managers, §210(a)(1)(C),
as long as those directors and managers are not “responsible for the failed con‐
dition of the covered financial company.” §206(4), (5).
4 §204(d).
5 §204(a).
6 §210(a)(1)(G).
7 §210(h)(5)(A), §210(h)(2)(G).
3
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for up to five years,8 with a view to merging it with another institution
or selling a majority of its equity to private investors.9 Of course, the
bridge may be short on cash. If it is, the FDIC can authorize the equiva‐
lent of DIP financing on terms virtually identical to those permitted by
§364.10 The rights of secured creditors are generally left unaffected.
While the bridge can obtain a priming lien, the FDIC must go to court
and show it is providing adequate protection.11 Taken together, these
powers give the FDIC the ability to implement rough approximations of
§363 sales and Chapter 11 reorganizations.
This concentration of power in the hands of one agency, the FDIC,
is a marked departure from prevailing bankruptcy law. So is the new
law’s approach to financial contracts. A key driver of the new regime
was the need for a better mechanism to handle these contracts. Ironi‐
cally, the need for a new law came not so much from their treatment in
bankruptcy, but rather from their exclusion from the bankruptcy proc‐
ess altogether. Financial contracts were placed outside the reach of the
automatic stay and other key bankruptcy laws for several reasons. One
of the most important is that providing debtors with a long window in
which to make the assume‐or‐reject decision creates an opportunity for
cherry‐picking that ordinary executory contracts do not. Excluding
these contracts, however, requires a distressed company to forfeit the
bulk of its financial contracts when it reorganizes. While this might not
be a problem for an ordinary company, such a categorical rule effec‐
tively forces the liquidation of financial companies. The experience of
Lehman Brothers suggests that such liquidations are costly, at least for a
company that is systemically important.
The new regime modifies this rule, giving the FDIC a short window
(up to two business days) to subject financial contracts to a limited
automatic stay and transfer them to a solvent counterparty. At the end
of that window, the usual rules apply and parties to these financial con‐
tracts are free to exercise their contractual rights. The heart of this new
regime, in short, reflects not so much a repudiation of bankruptcy prin‐
ciples, but rather finding a treatment for financial contracts that charts a
middle course between the Code’s treatment for ordinary conventional
contracts and for financial contracts. Subjecting financial contracts to a
§210(h)(12).
§210(h)(13).
10 §210(h)(16).
11 §210(h)(16)(C)(ii).
8
9
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(very short) automatic stay is costly, but so too is insulating them from
the process altogether.
In this paper we examine the general structure of this new regime
from the perspective of the bankruptcy lawyer. We first examine the
part of Title II that is most foreign to the bankruptcy lawyer, the mecha‐
nism it puts in place for determining eligibility and for commencing the
receivership. In the next part, we recap briefly the substantive provi‐
sions of the law itself. We highlight some of the unsettled questions and
potential areas of uncertainty, but for the most part it is quite familiar
ground. It is commonly said that the law reflects a decision to embrace
the regime for failed banks and turns its back on Chapter 11, but the end
place may not be that different from where we would have been if a
new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code had been crafted to deal with the
problem of systemically important financial companies. In the final part
of the paper, we focus in particular on features of the law that may blunt
its effectiveness.
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I. Commencing the Title II Receivership
Much of the mystery associated with the new receivership regime
lies at the start of the process. There is a complicated mechanism for
identifying an eligible entity, and then a rather exotic avenue of judicial
review. That the trigger for this new kind of receivership is new should
come as no surprise. It arises from the need to protect the legitimate in‐
terests of investors while at the same time ensuring that decisive action
can be taken when unanticipated systemic risks suddenly manifest
themselves.
A. Eligible Entities
Title II, like the rest of Dodd‐Frank, is squarely focused on Wall
Street. A company is eligible only if it is Fed‐regulated or if at least
eighty‐five percent of consolidated revenues arise from activities that
are “financial in nature.”12 The eighty‐five percent threshold precludes
large industrial giants (the GMs of the world), no matter how systemi‐
cally important they may be.13
It is easy to name companies excluded from Title II, but harder to
say which are included. Title I provides for a Financial Stability Over‐
sight Council that identifies nonbank financial companies that are “sys‐
temically important.” These companies will be subject to regulation and
those involved with these companies will know that they are potentially
exposed to Title II. The triggering mechanism in Title II, however, is
largely independent of Title I. A financial company can be eligible for
receivership under Title II even if it was never before thought systemi‐
cally important for purposes of Title I. This reflects the intuition that,
while comparatively few companies whose activities are financial in na‐
ture are systemically important, they cannot always be identified in ad‐
vance.
§201(a)(11)(iii), (iv); §201(b).
In theory, this criterion also prevents companies like Enron from enter‐
ing Title II. Much of Enron’s business was focused on trading activity that
would fall within the definition of a “financial activity,” but it also owned
enough hard assets, such as pipelines and power plants, to remove it from the
ambit of the statute. However, Title I of Dodd‐Frank gives the Federal Reserve
authority to force a company like Enron to separate its financial activities into
an “intermediate holding company” that is subject to both Fed oversight and
receivership under Title II. See §113(c)(3).
12
13
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In the abstract, the eligibility standards are relatively straightfor‐
ward. Only a “financial company” is potentially subject to receivership.
“Financial company” is a defined term. Only domestic entities fall
within its ambit, which includes bank holding companies and nonbank
companies supervised by the Federal Reserve, as well as any company
predominantly engaged in activities that are “financial in nature.” Ac‐
tivities that are “financial in nature” are those the Federal Reserve Board
identifies pursuant to a section of the Bank Holding Company Act,
which limits the activities in which a financial holding company can en‐
gage beyond owning a bank.14 The identified activities can evolve over
time, but the statute provides a set of activities that are explicitly finan‐
cial in nature. These include “providing financial, investment, or eco‐
nomic advisory services” and “insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying
against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing
and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker.” Most
importantly, financial activities include “lending, exchanging, transfer‐
ring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or securities.”15
This last provision has the effect of making hedge funds and private
equity funds potentially subject to Title II. Thus, while commercial
banks are subject to FDIC oversight when they are healthy and when
they are distressed, many financial companies are, in theory, exposed to
the risk of seizure without having any previous interactions with the
FDIC, or even knowing that they might be subject to it. The risk of sei‐
zure does not diminish even if the financial company files a petition un‐
der the Bankruptcy Code: A Title II proceeding can be commenced re‐
gardless of any pending bankruptcy case.16 Not only is there the poten‐
tial surprise, but, again in contrast to an ordinary bank, the financial
company may find itself in the hands of a regulator who knows nothing
about it and lacks both the information and the competence to handle its
assets effectively.
Of course, the inexperience of the FDIC does not distinguish Title II
from the bankruptcy process, which calls for decisions by judges who
know comparatively little about the firm or its industry. What does dis‐
tinguish Title II is the concentration of decisionmaking authority in the
hands of a single regulator. That authority is fragmented in the bank‐
12 U.S.C. §1843(k).
12 U.S.C. §1843(k)(4)(A).
16 §208(a).
14
15
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ruptcy process. Although judges issue final orders, they are primarily
refereeing a bargaining process that vests considerable power in the
hands of the debtor in possession and its creditors.
This concentration of authority in the hands of the FDIC may find
some justification in the experience of Long‐Term Capital Management.
While LTCM was a well‐known hedge fund, few anticipated in advance
that, when its derivative contracts turned sour, many large financial in‐
stitutions were potentially exposed to catastrophic loss. In the case of
LTCM, private parties (after significant coaxing from the Federal Re‐
serve) were able to execute a successful workout. But it is easy to imag‐
ine a scenario in which this would not have been possible. Dodd‐Frank
gives the government the ability to step decisively into the breach in
such a case. Such speedy decisionmaking could be substantially harder
in a regime, like the Bankruptcy Code, in which decisionmaking author‐
ity is fragmented across multiple parties.
We have highlighted the danger that a Title II liquidation could
take a company by surprise, but Title II puts many safeguards in place.
Before a Title II liquidation can begin there are both substantive and
procedural hurdles. Section 203(b) provides that, before the liquidation
can begin, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Presi‐
dent, must first find that a financial company is “in default or is in dan‐
ger of default.” This inquiry is much like the Bankruptcy Code’s provi‐
sions for the commencement of an involuntary case. It requires the Sec‐
retary to find that a case is likely to be commenced under the Bank‐
ruptcy Code, that the company has or is likely to incur losses that will
deplete its assets and it will be unable to protect them, that its assets are
less than its obligations to creditors, or that it is unable or likely to be
unable to pay its obligations in the ordinary course of business.17 Be‐
cause these rules are largely in harmony with the rules for an involun‐
tary case, the company itself cannot be too surprised to find control
wrested from it. Circumstances have to be so bad that, in the absence of
Title II, the same company could have been pushed into bankruptcy.
The difference is largely the decisionmaker—the Secretary, rather than
unhappy creditors.
Less clear‐cut and more important is the requirement that, before
the receivership begins, the Secretary find that alternative ways of re‐
solving the financial distress “would have serious adverse effects on the
17

§203(b)(4).
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financial stability of the United States.” The success of Chapter 11 in
handling the collapse of very large corporations (such as Enron, General
Motors, and Conseco) suggests that this threshold is a high one. More‐
over, the Secretary has to find that “no viable private sector alternative
is available to prevent the default.” In theory, this should further limit
the scope of this provision as workouts of the sort that we saw in LTCM
need to be off the table as well. Of course, the absence of such a receiv‐
ership regime may be what brings private parties to the table in such
cases. The presence of Title II may make them less inclined to do so.
The Secretary must also engage in some balancing of the interests of
creditors, counterparties, and shareholders, but the balancing required
is somewhat toothless. The Secretary must find only that the effect on
their claims and interests is “appropriate” given the danger posed to the
“financial stability of the United States.”18 Moreover, in making her de‐
cision, she must be on guard for how her failure to take action has the
“potential to increase excessive risk taking on the part of creditors,
counterparties, and shareholders.”19
In addition to the substantive criteria for taking action, there are
also significant procedural hurdles. Before the Secretary of the Treasure
can act, a “recommendation” must be obtained from both the Federal
Reserve Board and the FDIC.20 Two‐thirds of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve and, separately, two‐thirds of the members of the
FDIC’s Board of Directors must issue a recommendation regarding the
proposed receivership (curiously, though, the statute does not say that
the “recommendation” must be a recommendation in favor of the receiv‐
ership).21 This approval protocol has often been dubbed a “three‐key”
process because three approvals are required.22 By placing two of the
keys in the hands of independent agencies, the trigger is insulated from
the pressures of day‐to‐day political forces.
§203(b)(4).
§203(b)(5).
20 For some entities, other agencies replace the FDIC. The SEC replaces the
FDIC for brokers and dealers, and the Director of the Federal Insurance Office
for insurance companies.
21 §203(a)(1)(A).
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Avoiding Eight‐Alarm Fires in the Political
Economy of Systemic Risk Management,” working paper (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553880.
18
19
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, the entities that will find
themselves in Title II are likely those financial companies already sub‐
ject to oversight under Title I. This regulatory oversight, like any other,
may be done badly, but it seems unlikely that those regulated will be
caught unawares or that those who trigger the Title II liquidation will be
wholly in the dark or that the FDIC will be caught flat‐footed when it
becomes the receiver.
B. Judicial Review
The seizure of a financial company, like the seizure of anything else
by the government, entitles those affected some access to judicial re‐
view. At first blush, it might seem that this legislation may fall short.
The Act emphasizes repeatedly that “[e]xcept as provided in this title,
no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers
or functions of the receiver hereunder, and any remedy against the Cor‐
poration or receiver shall be limited to money damages determined in
accordance with this title.”23 The Act permits only challenges to the
threshold decision to commence the receivership, not to the details of its
administration. A court enters the picture during the receivership prin‐
cipally to review claims and ensure adequate protection of secured
creditors subject to priming liens.
After the Secretary decides to take action, she must first seek con‐
sent from the board of directors of the financial company. The question
of whether the government is overreaching arises only if such consent is
not forthcoming, and one suspects it almost always will be. Board
members will likely see the folly of trying to fight off the Secretary, the
Federal Reserve, and the FDIC simultaneously. Moreover, they will also
look to the comfort provided by §207, which protects them from liability
for consenting in good faith to the receivership.
If she fails to obtain the consent of the board of directors of the fi‐
nancial company, the Secretary must petition the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for an order authorizing the ap‐
§210(e). Similarly, §210(a)(9)(D) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise pro‐
vided in this title, no court shall have jurisdiction over—(i) any claim or action
for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect
to, the assets of any covered financial company for which the Corporation has
been appointed receiver, including any assets which the Corporation may ac‐
quire from itself as such receiver; or (ii) any claim relating to any act or omis‐
sion of such covered financial company or the Corporation as receiver.”
23
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pointment of the FDIC as receiver.24 This is the only process that the
company enjoys, and the scope of the court’s review is narrow. It is lim‐
ited to assessing whether “the determination of the Secretary that the
covered financial company is in default or in danger of default and sat‐
isfies the definition of a financial company under section §201(a)(11) is
arbitrary and capricious.”25 The district court is required to act within
twenty‐four hours.26 If it fails to act, the petition is granted by operation
of law.
Once FDIC receivership commences, any pending proceedings in
bankruptcy courts or before the SIPC must be dismissed.27 The FDIC
may exercise its authority as receiver for up to five years (the receiver‐
ship can be extended additional years if necessary to pursue litigation).28
The scope of FDIC authority varies with the type of institution. With
respect to brokers and dealers, the Corporation must appoint SIPC as
trustee. If any assets and liabilities are not transferred by the FDIC to a
bridge financial company, they are administered by SIPC pursuant to
the typical rules applied in broker‐dealer liquidations.29 With respect to
insurance companies, resolution must be conducted by the appropriate
state regulators pursuant to state law.30 With respect to other financial
companies, the FDIC serves as receiver and trustee and applies the pro‐
cedures outlined in the Act, particularly §210. Thus, with respect to bro‐
kers, dealers, and insurance companies, the same government actor ad‐
ministers the institution’s insolvency, whether it is subject to FDIC re‐
ceivership or not. For other financial institutions, the relevant govern‐
§202(a)(1)(A)(i).
§202(a)(1)(A)(iii).
26 §202(a)(1)(A)(v).
27 §208.
28 §202(d)(4)
29 §205(a), (b). Although the SIPC must apply to a district court for a pro‐
tective decree, the court is required to issue the decree automatically,
§205(a)(2)(A), and “no court may take any action … to restrain or affect the ex‐
ercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as receiver for a covered bro‐
ker or dealer.” §205(c). To the extent that counterparties or creditors are ag‐
grieved by the transfer of assets to a bridge financial company, they may bring
suit for money damages in a district court. §205(e).
30 §203(e)(1). If state regulators fail to act promptly (within 60 days after
the Secretary’s decision, or after district‐court approval of that decision), the
FDIC may step into the shoes of the regulators. §203(e)(3).
24
25
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ment actor is different outside receivership (the bankruptcy courts) than
inside (the FDIC, subject to limited judicial review).
The district court’s decision is appealable, but there is no stay of the
decision pending appeal, the appeal must be brought within thirty days,
the appellate court must consider the appeal on an expedited basis, and
the court is again limited to arbitrary and capricious review.31 More to
the point, the court’s decision “shall not be subject to any stay or injunc‐
tion pending appeal.”32 As a practical matter, virtually any appellate
review is likely to be equitably moot by the time it is heard.
While this highly accelerated judicial process is extraordinary, in all
likelihood it is not constitutionally suspect. The most obvious constitu‐
tional questions here arise from the Takings and Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment. The former forbids government seizure of private
property for public use without just compensation. An FDIC receiver‐
ship is undoubtedly a taking of private property for public use. The
Corporation “succeed[s] to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
covered company and its assets, and of any stockholder, member, offi‐
cer, or director of such company.”33 And the Act undoubtedly offers
compensation to aggrieved parties: “any person having a claim against
the Corporation as receiver” is guaranteed compensation equal to what
the person “would have received if the Corporation had not been ap‐
pointed receiver” and the company instead were liquidated under state
or federal law.34 In theory, this compensation formula guarantees some‐
thing close to just compensation. To be sure, recoveries are likely to be
small or nonexistent. If the company’s failure would indeed imperil the
overall economy, we need to imagine what creditors would be paid in a
world in which the overall economy is cratering and the government is
doing nothing to stop it. Recoveries in that world are likely to be mini‐
mal. In application, of course, the FDIC may not compute just compen‐
sation correctly, but even then claimants could bring suit against the
FDIC under the Tucker Act. Although Dodd‐Frank repeatedly states
that “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of
powers or functions of the receiver,” it acknowledges claimants’ ability
§202(a)(1)(B), §202(a)(2).
§202(a)(1)(B).
33 §210(a)(1)(A)(i).
34 §210(d)(2).
31
32
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to bring suit for money damages, presumably under the Tucker Act.35
That is enough to avoid complications under the Takings Clause.36
Due Process questions loom a bit larger. The process here is one in
which the financial company is given advance notice and opportunity
for a judicial hearing.37 Notice and an opportunity to be heard generally
constitute due process.38 The difficulty here, however, is the nature of
the hearing. The District Court is not permitted to review the decision of
the Secretary on the merits. Instead, it is obliged to focus narrowly on
two questions: (i) whether the financial company is in default or in dan‐
ger of default, and (ii) whether it satisfies the definition of a “financial
company.” Moreover, the District Court must apply an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard
standing alone does not seem problematic. The Supreme Court has long
held that such review of agency action meets muster as a constitutional
matter.39 It is the standard typically used in administrative law and
courts have found it appropriate in assessing the decision to appoint
receivers under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En‐
forcement Act (“FIRREA”).40
The potential problem is not the standard of review, but the limita‐
tion on what can be reviewed. The court has no power to review the
other critical findings that the Secretary must make before triggering the
receivership. These findings include that the company’s default exposes
the United States to “serious adverse effects on financial stability” and
that “no viable private sector alternative is available.”41 These findings
seem as “jurisdictional” as the determinations that are subject to judicial
review (the institution is in or danger of default and is a financial com‐
pany), yet even if these findings are arbitrary and capricious, the legisla‐
tion deprives the court of the power to do anything about it. We admit
35
36

§210(e).
See, e.g., Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102

(1974).
§202(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
39 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
40 See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934
F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
41 §203(b).
37
38
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to being uncertain, however, whether this poses serious constitutional
problems.42
Another potential problem is the mandate that the proceedings be
conducted within twenty‐four hours and in secrecy. It seems implausi‐
ble that a reviewing court could digest the complex factual and legal
issues within twenty‐four hours. The time constraint will likely deprive
financial companies of a meaningful opportunity for a hearing prior to a
taking of their property, which is generally the acid test of a due process
violation.43 To be sure, the company’s owners can seek appellate review,
but the lack of a stay pending appeal means that the issues will likely be
moot by the time the appeal is decided.
Secrecy is a potential problem as well. The petition is to be filed un‐
der seal and the district court must act without any prior public disclo‐
sure. Moreover, no one else is permitted to disclose the pendency of the
court proceeding either. A person who recklessly makes such a disclo‐
sure is subject to criminal sanctions, including up to five years in
prison.44 A mandate that such proceedings be secret may be constitu‐
tionally suspect, not because of due process, but because of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that
secret criminal trials are inconsistent with the First Amendment rights
of the press.45 The Court has not yet found a right of public access for
We are uncertain because the doctrine in this area is complex. Existing
caselaw suggests that Congress has wide authority to restrict judicial review in
public right cases. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Ch. 4 (6th ed.
2009). We thank Henry Monaghan for his help here.
43 Thus, although the FDIC has emphasized that the Act permits judicial
review sooner than other federal statutes that commence receiverships, imme‐
diate review under the Act is likely less meaningful than delayed review under
other statutes. See FDIC, “Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the
Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” 12 CFR Part
380, p. 4208 n. 1 (Jan. 25, 2011).
44 §202(a)(1)(C).
45 Press‐Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“The
open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of justice today
as it did for centuries before our separation from England. The value of open‐
ness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence
that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed
and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic
42
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civil trials, but some lower courts have.46 Moreover, the logic of granting
access to criminal proceedings applies equally with respect to civil pro‐
ceedings. Exceptions can be made, of course, but in theory the way in
which they must be made creates a problem. While the legislation man‐
dates secrecy, the Court has also held that case‐specific findings are re‐
quired to overcome the presumption of openness.47
The secrecy provisions are unlikely to be contested. On the merits,
success is far from certain. There is a long history of nondisclosure in the
context of bank regulation,48 and the adverse consequences of premature
disclosure are easy to imagine. More to the point, the only ones in a po‐
sition to complain about the secrecy are the directors of the financial
company, as they are the only ones who know about it, and they are
probably the last one who would want the petition for a receivership to
be disclosed.
In the abstract, it might seem that even if each of these limitations
on due process and freedom of speech were permissible, the combina‐
tion of all of them might be toxic. It might seem that the government
should not be able to gain the right to seize assets worth many billions
by providing only a hearing done in the dark of night with the most
critical issues taken off the table. But it likely suffices. Those who are
adversely affected do have the right to go to court at a later time to ad‐
judicate their claims.49 Recoveries are likely to be minimal, but the talis‐
man of a due process violation has long been the inability to have one’s
claim adjudicated. That never happens here.
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to pub‐
lic confidence in the system.”). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
46 Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2004).
47 Press‐Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510 (“The presumption of openness
may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that in‐
terest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that
a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly en‐
tered.”).
48 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(8) (exempting from FOIA information “con‐
tained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions”).
49 §210(a)(4).
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More to the point, it is hard to imagine the circumstances under
which challenges to these procedures are likely to be entertained. Politi‐
cal forces work to dissuade the Secretary from acting. She has every in‐
centive to convince herself that a company is not systemically impor‐
tant. Given these incentives, it is unlikely that a court would conclude
that the Secretary’s findings (of systemic risk and the absence of private
alternatives) were arbitrary and capricious, even if it had the power to
make such a finding.
II. Elements of the Title II Receivership
Title II gives the FDIC expansive discretion in winding‐down an in‐
stitution in receivership. The most striking difference between the Title
II receivership and a traditional reorganization is the absence of a debtor
in possession. Upon being appointed as receiver, the FDIC succeeds to
all powers of the company and its owners, including the power to oper‐
ate the company, continue the employ of existing employees, and hire
third parties, such as attorneys, asset management companies, and bro‐
kerage services.50 The FDIC may also appoint itself receiver of any dis‐
tressed subsidiary whose failure would threaten market stability in the
United States.51 The basic dynamics of the case are the same ones we see
in Chapter 11.
A. Liquidating and Reorganizing the Institutions
Modern reorganizations of large corporations usually take the form
of a sale. Title II contemplates a similar process. The FDIC has the op‐
tion of a piecemeal asset sale.52 Its favored avenue will likely be a
merger of the institution with another company.53 The FDIC can also
separate the good and bad assets and place the good assets in a new en‐
tity at the very start. The specific mechanism is the establishment of a
“bridge financial company” to which the FDIC will transfer some of the
institution’s assets and liabilities. The FDIC will operate the company
until it can be merged with another institution or until its equity can be
sold to private investors.54
See §210(a)(1)(A)‐(D), §210(a)(1)(L).
§210(a)(1)(E).
52 §210(a)(1)(G)(i)(II).
53 §210(A)(1)(G)(i)(I).
54 §201(A)(1)(F).
50
51
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Through the creation of bridge financial companies, the FDIC can
(implicitly) administer a conservatorship of the failing financial institu‐
tion. A bridge financial company is a temporary financial institution
owned and indirectly managed by the FDIC.55 The FDIC is authorized
but not required to capitalize the bridge bank.56 Alternatively, the bank
can raise funds either by issuing equity or debt in private markets. Al‐
though it has a Federal charter, articles of association and bylaws that
the FDIC drafts, a board of directors that the FDIC selects, and exemp‐
tion from state or federal taxation, the bridge is not considered “an
agency, establishment, or instrumentality of the United States.”57
The Corporation has virtually absolute discretion in selecting assets
and liabilities to transfer to the bridge.58 The bridge will manage this
portfolio with a view to merging with another financial company, sell‐
ing a majority of its capital stock to private investors, or assumption of
substantially all of the bridge’s assets or liabilities by another institu‐
tion.59 The bridge financial company can be dissolved at any time by the
FDIC.60 Merger with another company automatically terminates the
company’s status as a bridge financial company. So does sale of at least
eighty percent of its capital stock.61 The FDIC may also choose to termi‐
nate the company’s status as a bridge if it sells at least fifty percent of its
stock to private investors or if another institution assumes substantially
all of the bridge company’s liabilities or purchases substantially all of its
assets.62
B. Running the Process and Administering Claims
The landmarks of the Bankruptcy Code—automatic stay, claim al‐
lowance, avoidance actions—are evident in Title II. But Title II is littered
with sometimes surprising deviations from the bankruptcy lawyer’s
norm. Often these deviations are vindicating core policies of the reform
legislation: facilitating rapid decisionmaking by the FDIC, avoiding the
perception of a “bailout” by forcing the company’s stakeholders to bear
§210(h)(2).
§210(h)(2)(G).
57 §210(h)(2)(A)‐(D), (8)(A), (10).
58 §210(h)(1)(B).
59 §210(h).
60 §210(h)(15).
61 §210(h)(13)(A), (C).
62 §210(h)(13)(B), (D).
55
56

Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers / 17

losses, and minimizing the burden on taxpayers.63 In some other cases,
the deviations aren’t deviations at all, but rather a delegation of author‐
ity to the FDIC to fill in gaps.
Automatic stay, claims allowance, and executory contracts. The need for
FDIC speed likely explains deviations from the Code’s rules governing
the automatic stay and claims allowance. Any collective process of a dis‐
tressed firm must put a stop to the individual efforts of investors to grab
assets. The Bankruptcy Code does this through its automatic stay, which
stops all formal and informal collection efforts everywhere. Title II does
something similar by cutting off all rights of shareholders and creditors,
“except for their right to payment, resolution or other satisfaction of
their claims,”64 by barring counterparties to contracts (other than quali‐
fied financial contracts65) from enforcing ipso facto clauses during the 90
days following commencement of the receivership,66 and by forbidding
courts from issuing attachment or execution upon assets in the FDIC’s
possession.67 But the commencement of a Title II receivership does not
automatically stay judicial proceedings. The FDIC must instead petition
to stay these proceedings. Although courts must grant the petition, the
stay cannot exceed ninety days.68
Similar deadlines force the FDIC to act quickly in allowing and dis‐
allowing claims. Under Title II, claims are defined as expansively as
they are under the Bankruptcy Code,69 but the allowance/disallowance
§§204(a), 206.
§210(a)(1)(M).
65 §210(c)(13)(C)(ii).
66 §210(c)(13)(C)(i).
67 §201(a)(9)(C).
68 §210(a)(8).
69 §210(a)(4). In this respect Title II differs from the FDIA. Those whose
rights against a bank are contingent have found that their rights may be
slighted under receiverships under that Act. The FDIC grounds this position in
12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(3). See, e.g., FDIC Statement of Policy regarding Treatment of
Collateralized Letters of Credit after Appointment of the FDIC as Conservator
or Receiver, 60 Fed. Reg. 27976, May 26, 1995, effective May 19, 1995. See also
210(c)(3)(E), which recognizes the FDIC’s authority to value contingent claims.
The FDIC proposes to value these claims in the same ways that bankruptcy
courts do. See FDIC, “Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd‐
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” Supplementary In‐
formation, 12 CFR Part 380, p. 4213 (Jan. 25, 2011); see also Interim Rule 380.4,
at p. 4216.
63
64
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decision must be rendered within 180 days after commencement of the
receivership (extensions are possible, however).70 If speedier decision‐
making is necessary to avoid “irreparable injury” to a claimant, the
FDIC must render a decision within ninety days.71 The Corporation may
disallow all or part of any timely‐filed claim that is “not proved to the
satisfaction of the Corporation.” If, however, a claim is disallowed, the
claimant may seek judicial determination of its claim in a federal district
court.72
The FDIC is free to affirm or repudiate any ongoing contract, free of
judicial review, within a “reasonable period of time.”73 Counterparties
to repudiated contracts are entitled to damages claims, but claims for
punitive damages, lost profits, or pain and suffering are disallowed.74
An unusual feature here, from a bankruptcy perspective, is the Corpora‐
tion’s authority to assume executory loan agreements. Section
210(a)(12)(D) authorizes the FDIC to enforce “any contract to extend
credit to the covered financial company or bridge financial company.”
This too likely reflects the policy in favor of a speedy receivership proc‐
ess: whenever possible, the FDIC can draw on existing lines of credit.
Avoidance actions. Some differences between the Bankruptcy Code
and Title II may be unintentional. For example, Section 210(a)(11) sets
out avoidance powers that are virtually identical to the fraudulent con‐
veyance and preferential transfer provisions of §547 and §548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. One important difference is the use of the bona fide
purchaser for value as the benchmark for determining whether a trans‐
fer is perfected rather than hypothetical lien creditor.75 Another differ‐
ence is the standard for intentional fraudulent transfers to non‐insiders.
The Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee to attack intentional fraudu‐
lent transfers regardless of the debtor’s financial condition at the time of
the transfer.76 By contrast, Title II subjects them to attack only if they
§210(a)(3)(A)(i).
§210(a)(5)(B).
72 §210(a)(4).
73 §210(c)(1),(2).
74 §210(c)(3)(A),(B).
75 §210(a)(11)(H)(i)(II). The Proposed Rules provide, however, that the
FDIC will avoid transfers properly only if they can be avoided by a creditor on
a simple contract who acquires a judicial lien. See Proposed Rule §380.9(b)(3).
76 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).
70
71
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rendered the firm insolvent or occurred while the firm was insolvent.77
In light of the Reform Act drafter’s obvious intention to track the Bank‐
ruptcy Code, this may be an unintentional drafting error. Someone who
engages in a sham transaction that has many badges of fraud should not
get off the hook merely because her machinations took place while the
firm was still above water.
Another puzzling difference is the absence of a provision analogous
to §544 of the Bankruptcy Code, which (among other things) gives the
trustee power to attack unperfected security interests. That power may
be implicit in §210(a)(1)(D), which states that the FDIC “shall, as re‐
ceiver for a covered financial company, and subject to all legally en‐
forceable and perfected security interests and all legally enforceable se‐
curity entitlements in respect of assets held by the covered financial
company, liquidate, and wind‐up the affairs of a covered financial com‐
pany … .”78
Creditor priorities. A desire to protect taxpayers likely explains the
priorities among unsecured claims set out in §210(b)(1). These deviate
substantially from the Code,79 particularly with respect to the claims of
the federal government. First priority goes to administrative expenses,80
followed by any amounts owed to the United States,81 then wages, sala‐
ries, and commissions owed to ordinary employees, and finally contri‐
butions owed to employee benefit plans. These employee claims are
subject to the same $11,725 ceiling (indexed for inflation) as in §507 of
the Bankruptcy. After these priority claims come all other general unse‐
§210(a)(i), (ii).
The power may also be implicit in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which gives a lien creditor priority over creditors unperfected security
interests. §9‐317(a)(2). A “lien creditor” includes “a receiver in equity.” §9‐
102(52).
79 But the priority provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are hard to derive
from first principle, and hence it is hard to argue that these make less sense.
80 Super‐administrative expense priority goes to debt incurred by the FDIC
as receiver for the financial company. §210(b)(2).
81 It remains unclear, however, what constitutes “amounts owed to the
United States.” Might it include fines levied by the SEC? See National Bank‐
ruptcy Conference, Letter dated May 21, 2011, responding to Notice of Pro‐
posed Rulemaking, 12 CFR Part 380, Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 56, p. 16324
(Mar.
23,
2011)
(available
at
www.fdic.gov/regulations/
laws/federal/2011/11comad73.html) (“NBC Letter”).
77
78
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cured claims and then subordinated unsecured claims, followed by
wages, salaries, and commissions owed to senior executives and direc‐
tors. Anything left goes to equity holders.
But the FDIC can deviate from this scheme to promote market sta‐
bility. The Corporation has broad authority to favor some creditors over
others with equal priority, provided that the favored treatment maxi‐
mizes asset value, minimizes losses, or is otherwise essential to the re‐
ceivership.82 The Corporation may also pay some creditors immediately,
but defer payments on others.83 But even these outcomes are not unfa‐
miliar to bankruptcy lawyers. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, creditors
as a class can agree to take less than others if it is the sensible course.
Moreover, the debtor enjoys a limited ability to make payments to criti‐
cal vendors and others if it advances the interests of the estate as a
whole. Title II permits much the same,84 though it is vindicating a differ‐
ent policy (market stability).
Secured claims, setoffs, and adequate protection. At first glance, the Act
appears congruent with the Bankruptcy Code: Secured claims are bifur‐
cated under the Act in much the same way that they are under Section
506 of the Code;85 rights of setoff are preserved under the Act unless
they run afoul of tests that resemble Section 553 of the Code.86 But there
are fundamental omissions in the Act’s treatment of secured claims and
setoff rights. The most important is the absence of adequate protection
remedies analogous to Sections 361, 362(d), and 363(e) of the Bank‐
ruptcy Code. If collateral is depreciating in value, there are no avenues
by which a secured creditor can petition the FDIC for either (i) adequate
protection or (ii) permission to exercise its contractual rights against col‐
lateral. Nor are there avenues for relief in the event that the covered fi‐
§210(b)(4).
§210(a)(7)(A).
84 While the language of Title II seems to give the FDIC broad discretion to
pay some and not others, the FDIC’s proposed rules thus far reflect the under‐
standing that this provision will operate in the same fashion as a critical vendor
order. It would generally prohibit the FDIC from using its Title II authority to
favor holders of long‐term senior unsecured debt, subordinated unsecured
debt, and equity (though the FDIC’s Board can, under special circumstances,
make exceptions to this rule). Interim Rule §380.2(b), 12 CFR Part 380, p. 4215
(Jan. 25, 2011).
85 §210(a)(3)(D)(ii).
86 §210(a)(12)(A), (B).
82
83
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nancial company has no equity in collateral that is unnecessary to suc‐
cessful completion of the receivership process.
This may be less problematic than it appears. Unlike the Bank‐
ruptcy Code, the Act will be fleshed out by a regulator, the FDIC. Con‐
gress has directed the FDIC to “harmonize applicable rules and regula‐
tions promulgated under this section with the insolvency laws that
would otherwise apply to a covered financial company.”87 Given that
other provisions of the Act require that creditors receive no less than
they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation, it seems likely that the FDIC will
implement rules that offer secured creditors adequate protection reme‐
dies similar to Sections 361, 362(d), and 363(e). These remedies would be
available to creditors during a Chapter 7 liquidation.
But the FDIC can harmonize the Act with the Code only to the ex‐
tent that the Act permits harmonization. In one important respect, it
does not. The Act permits the Corporation to sell assets free and clear of
setoff claims without offering adequate protection. Once assets are sold,
the setoff claim is demoted from the equivalent of a secured claim (un‐
der Bankruptcy law) to an unsecured claim (under the Act) with priority
above general unsecured claims but below all priority claims (adminis‐
trative expenses, amounts owed to the United States, and certain em‐
ployee‐related claims).88 It is unclear how this rule vindicates core poli‐
cies of the Act.
Postpetition financing. The desire to avoid anything resembling a
“bailout” figured large in the political dynamics of the Act. This mani‐
fests itself in several places. One place is in the rules governing postpeti‐
tion financing. In recent years, the DIP financer has emerged as one of
the major players in the reorganization process. Title II contemplates
that this role too is one that the FDIC will assume, although private
loans are also possible. The FDIC has authority to extend loans to the
covered financial company, purchase the institution’s debt obligations,
purchase or guarantee its assets, assume or guarantee its obligations,
and take a lien on its assets.89 The FDIC may not, however, take an eq‐
§209. With respect to post‐petition interest, see also §210(a)(7)(B), which
guarantees that creditors receive no less than they would in a Chapter 7 liqui‐
dation. During such a liquidation, an oversecured creditor would be entitled to
the protections of Section 506(b). See also NBC Letter, supra note 81, at 3‐4.
88 §210(a)(12)(F).
89 §204(d).
87
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uity interest in the institution, reflecting Congress’s aversion to AIG‐
style bailouts.90
Anti‐bailout philosophy is more apparent in other limits on the
FDIC. The Corporation must finance its activities as receiver through an
“orderly liquidation fund,” which is funded by borrowings from the
Treasury.91 The FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury, however,
is tightly constrained. The Corporation cannot issue debt in connection
with a receivership that exceeds specified thresholds. During the first
thirty days of the receivership, loans cannot exceed ten percent of the
covered financial company’s total consolidated assets, as measured by
the most recent financial statements. As soon as the FDIC determines
the fair market value of assets available for repayment of new debt (or
after the first thirty days of the receivership, whichever occurs first), the
FDIC can extend larger loans to the company, but the loans cannot ex‐
ceed ninety percent of those assets’ fair market value.92
To repay its obligations to the Treasury, the FDIC is permitted to
impose “assessments” on a broad range of financial institutions.93 Insti‐
tutions subject to assessment include those that received more than their
pro‐rata share of proceeds from a receivership commenced by the FDIC,
any bank holding company with at least $50 billion in total consolidated
assets, any nonbank financial company subject to the Fed’s systemic risk
oversight authority, and any other financial company with total con‐
solidated assets of at least $50 billion.94 In this way, Title II ensures that
losses from receiverships are borne primarily by the institution’s stake‐
holders and secondarily by members of the industry.
But the FDIC need not be the sole source of financing. If the Corpo‐
ration creates a bridge financial company, the company may obtain fi‐
nancing from private lenders. The rules governing this financing are
virtually identical to the rules governing DIP financing under the Code.
For example, if the bridge is unable to obtain unsecured credit, the FDIC
may authorize it to issue debt with priority over all other obligations
(super‐administrative expense priority), with a lien on unencumbered
assets, or with a junior lien on encumbered assets.95 The FDIC may also
§206(6).
§210(n)
92 §210(n)(6)
93 §210(o)(1)(B).
94 §210(o)(1)(A), (D).
95 §210(h)(16)(B).
90
91
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authorize the bridge to issue debt with first‐priority security interests in
property that is already encumbered by liens.96 Such a priming lien,
however, requires adequate protection and a hearing before a district
court.97 Title II cannot be faulted for providing too much process, but
here, as elsewhere, it seems to provide such process when it is due.98
Executives. Title II ensures that those responsible for the failure are
punished. In contrast with Chapter 11, which ordinarily allows the
board of directors to remain in place and continue to run the company,
Title II requires the removal of those responsible for the failed condition
of the company99 and the ability to recover any compensation they re‐
ceived during the two years before the start of the receivership.100 But
like Chapter 11, Title II includes multiple provisions designed to punish
senior executives and directors who contributed to the institution’s fail‐
ure. These provisions are similar in spirit to a number of rules added to
the Bankruptcy Code in 2005. The FDIC may sue directors, officers, at‐
torneys, accountants, and other actors for grossly negligent conduct that
resulted in the “improvident or otherwise improper use or investment
of any assets of the covered financial company.”101 The FDIC may also
claw back compensation paid during the two years preceding the re‐
ceivership from any current or former executive who is “substantially
responsible for the failed condition of the covered financial company.”102
Here, “compensation” is defined broadly to include salary, bonuses,
§210(h)(16)(C)(i).
§210(h)(16)(C)(ii).
98 Failing to provide secured creditors with adequate protection and ade‐
quate protection invites the sort of challenges that spelled trouble for Frazier‐
Lemke. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935);
Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
99 §206(5).
100 §210(s)(1). In contrast to some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code aimed
at excessive compensation, see, e.g., §548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV), this provision does not
focus on whether the executives were paid too much. In deciding whether to
pursue the responsible executives, the focus is elsewhere. Title II instructs the
FDIC to weigh the “financial and deterrent benefits” of recovery against “the
cost of executing the recovery.” §210(s)(2).
101 §210(f), (g).
102 §210(s). Under the proposed rules, the chief executive officer, chairman
of the board of directors, and the chief financial officer are all presumed to be
substantially responsible for the failed condition of a failed financial company.
Proposed Rule §380.7(b)(1)(i).
96
97
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benefits, golden parachute benefits, and “any profits realized from the
sale of the securities of the covered financial company.”103
Additionally, the Federal Reserve (or other appropriate agency) can
bar senior executives and directors from working for any financial insti‐
tution for a period not to exceed two years. Grounds for this sanction
include evidence that the executives or directors, directly or indirectly,
“engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound practice in connec‐
tion with any financial company,” “received financial gain or other
benefit by reason of ” this practice, and the practice “demonstrates will‐
ful or continuing disregard … for the safety or soundness of such com‐
pany.”104
C. Safe harbors for qualified financial contracts
Financial contracts are typically the core assets of nonbank financial
institutions. Before Title II, a distressed institution faced great chal‐
lenges in managing these assets due to the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe
harbors.” These safe harbors permit certain counterparties to qualified
financial contracts (QFCs)—repurchase agreements, commodity and
forward contracts, security contracts, and swaps—to treat a bankruptcy
filing as an event of default. They may terminate all contracts with the
distressed institution, net out and set‐off multiple contracts, compute a
net obligation, and seize available collateral to the extent that the net
obligation is owed by the institution. The automatic stay does not apply
to these counterparties; nor do the rules governing ipso facto clauses,
preferential transfers, or (constructive) fraudulent conveyances.
In short, the safe harbors ensure that a counterparty’s rights under a
qualified financial contract (QFC) are unaffected by the bankruptcy
process. These rules expose failing financial institutions to a rushed,
free‐for‐all liquidation by counterparties. This exposure is said to have
prompted the Federal Reserve’s efforts to orchestrate a bailout of Long‐
Term Capital Management in 1998. The Federal Reserve feared that a
free‐for‐all liquidation of LTCM would have destabilized markets. The
safe harbors may also have contributed to the market instability during
the days immediately before and after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
filing.
103
104

§210(s)(3).
§213.
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The Reform Act adopts a different approach to QFCs. The new ap‐
proach, modeled on the FDIA, continues to offer safe harbors for these
contracts. Counterparties to securities contracts, commodity and for‐
ward contracts, repurchase agreements, and swaps are still immune to
preferential and (constructive) fraudulent transfer avoidance actions.105
This safe harbor is potentially broader than the one available under the
Bankruptcy Code because it applies to all QFC counterparties, not just
the particular counterparties singled out for protection by the Code. For
example, while all swap counterparties benefit from the Code’s safe
harbors106 only designated counterparties to securities, commodity, and
forward contracts, such as commodity brokers, may benefit from the
Code’s safe harbors for those QFCs.107
Additionally, Title II continues to protect the contractual rights of
counterparties and to make clear that commencement of the receiver‐
ship process generally does not alter those rights. For example, it pro‐
vides that “no person shall be stayed or prohibited from exercising …
any right that such person has to cause the termination, liquidation, or
acceleration of any qualified financial contract with a covered financial
company which arises upon the date of appointment of the Corporation
as receiver for such covered financial company or at any time after such
appointment.”108
But the Reform Act does nullify, at least temporarily, some impor‐
tant contractual rights. First, ipso facto clauses (termination, netting, and
setoff rights) are stayed from the moment the receivership commences
until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern) on the next business day, or until the qualified
financial contracts have been transferred to another institution.109 Along
similar lines, the Act nullifies walkaway clauses that “suspend[ ], condi‐
tion[ ], or extinguish[ ] a payment obligation” of a counterparty “solely
because of” either the financial institution’s insolvency or the appoint‐
ment of the FDIC as receiver.110 Additionally, and with one exception,
§210(c)(8)(C)(i).
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §101(53C), §546(g).
107 See, e.g., §546(e).
108 §210(c)(8)(A)(i).
109 §210(c)(10)(B).
110 §210(c)(8)(F)(i), (iii). Presumably, these clauses are revived after the
qualified financial contract has been transferred to a third party (so that they
can be asserted if the third party subsequently becomes insolvent). Section
105
106

26 / Baird & Morrison

the Act temporarily suspends the payment obligations of the covered
financial institution.111 The exception involves QFCs traded through
clearing organizations: If the FDIC fails to satisfy any “margin, collat‐
eral, or settlement obligations under the rules of the clearing organiza‐
tion, the clearing organization shall have the immediate right to exer‐
cise, and shall not be stayed from exercising, all of its rights and reme‐
dies under its rules and applicable law.”112
By suspending ipso facto clauses, walkaway clauses, and payment
obligations (at least temporarily), the Act gives the FDIC time to repudi‐
ate QFCs or transfer them to other institutions. The time, however, is
quite limited. Both walkaway rights and contractual payment obliga‐
tions become enforceable again after (i) the contract has been transferred
to another entity, such as a bridge financial company, or (ii) 5:00 pm EST
on the business day following the date on which the FDIC was ap‐
pointed as receiver.113 However, a counterparty cannot enforce a wal‐
kaway right merely because QFCs have been transferred to a bridge
company, which “shall not be considered to be a financial institution for
which a conservator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or other legal cus‐
todian has been appointed, or which is otherwise the subject of a bank‐
ruptcy or insolvency proceeding.”
But the FDIC does not possess the same assume‐or‐reject authority
that the Bankruptcy Code gives to trustees and debtors in possession.
The Code allows the DIP to “cherry pick” contracts with the same coun‐
terparty. Instead of netting multiple contracts to compute an overall ob‐
ligation owed to or by the DIP, the Code allows DIPs to act strategically
by assuming contracts that are in‐the‐money (assuring full payment by
the counterparty) and rejecting those that are out‐of‐the‐money (assur‐
ing that counterparties are treated as ordinary unsecured creditors, who
typically receive less than full payment). The Reform Act implicitly for‐
bids this cherry‐picking by requiring the FDIC to repudiate all or none of
the QFCs with a given counterparty.114
210(c)(8)(F)(i) only refuses enforcement of walkaway clauses “in a qualified
financial contract of a covered financial company in default” (emphasis added).
111 §210(c)(8)(F)(ii). This suspension of payment obligations does not apply
to exchange‐traded QFCs.
112 §210(c)(8)(G).
113 §210(c)(8)(F)(ii), (10)(B)(i)
114 §210(c)(11).
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The same all‐or‐none principle applies to decisions by the FDIC to
transfer QFCs to a bridge financial company. The Corporation may
transfer all or none of the contracts with a particular counterparty. More‐
over, the transfer must include not just the contracts, but also any asso‐
ciated claims of or against the counterparty and any property or credit
enhancements securing obligations under the contract.115 In sum, Title II
ensures that the insolvency of the financial company leaves perform‐
ance of QFCs unaffected. Appointment of a receiver does not trigger
any changes in the contract. After being transferred to a bridge, the con‐
tract is performed according to its original terms, as if nothing had hap‐
pened.
Seen at a distance, these provisions chart a sensible middle course
between subjecting financial contracts to something akin to the auto‐
matic stay and exempting them entirely. All executory contracts give the
debtor in possession an opportunity to take advantage of the third
party. If you promise to sell the debtor a particular component at $100 at
the end of the year and the debtor files for bankruptcy when the market
price of that component is at $100, the debtor has an incentive to delay
the decision to accept or reject the executory contract. If the price falls,
the contract can be rejected; you as seller will receive a claim for dam‐
ages, but it will be paid pennies on the dollar. If the price of the compo‐
nent rises, the debtor (and all her creditors) will capture the benefit of
paying only $100 for a component that is worth more.
In the case of an ordinary contract, however, the volatility of the
price of the component is typically only one part of the picture, and of‐
ten it is a small part. The debtor delays the breach‐or‐perform decision,
not because it is exploiting price volatility, but rather because it takes
time to decide whether the debtor will even continue making the prod‐
uct for which the component is used, and because it takes time to de‐
termine whether a higher quality or more suitable substitute can be ob‐
tained elsewhere. Here, the costs that the automatic stay imposes on the
seller are small and the benefits to the debtor large.
In the case of a financial contract, by contrast, volatility matters
much more. Indeed, for the vast majority of debtors it is the only feature
that matters. A financial contract is, almost by definition, a contract in
§210(c)(9)(A). financial contracts could be firm‐specific assets. Think of a
specialized, OTC hedge: It is a special contract between two parties; it is not a
traded instrument.
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which the counterparties are trading volatility. The counterparties are
bearing opposite sides of the risk that market movements will change
the price of some underlying asset, index, or other measure of value. If
an automatic stay were applied to these contracts, it would fundamen‐
tally alter the terms of trade by giving the debtor the ability to gain from
favorable price movements and limit its liability for unfavorable ones
(“cherry‐picking”). Put differently, an automatic stay would give the
debtor the option value associated with the volatility in the underlying
price. Moreover, cancelling financial contracts typically presents few
problems for firms that are not systemically important. For the most
part, the financial contract brings no firm‐specific synergy.116 More to
the point, as long as the market is liquid, as it should be outside of the
times of crisis for which Title II is intended, the debtor can simply recre‐
ate the same contract and continue to enjoy whatever benefits the old
financial contract provided. To be sure, it may be very costly to recreate
the contract. The same market conditions that have rendered the debtor
insolvent have also probably raised the price it faces to enter new finan‐
cial contracts. But the same market discipline faces any troubled busi‐
ness, which will face different terms of trade when it is healthy than
when it is distressed.
This line of argument117 is often used to distinguish ordinary con‐
tracts from financial contracts and for subjecting only the former to the
automatic stay.118 A problem arises, however, in the case of systemically
There are, of course, some exceptions. For example, there can be cus‐
tomized contracts between two parties, such as a specialized OTC hedge that is
of particular value to the debtor and that cannot be readily replicated.
117 Another line of argument distinguishes ordinary contracts from QFCs
on grounds that the latter contracts are systemically important. Exempting
QFCs from the automatic stay, it is argued, promotes systemic stability. This
argument is controversial and hard to square with the Dodd‐Frank legislation,
which deviates from the bankruptcy code’s “safe harbors” for QFCs in order to
promote systemic stability. See Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison,
Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J. Reg. 91
(2005).
118 Although it is easy to identify reasons for offering different treatment to
ordinary and financial contracts, it is much harder to say what the appropriate
treatment is. Any ex post difference in treatment when a company becomes in‐
solvent will have complex ex ante effects on credit markets, as explored by
Mark J. Roe, The Derivative Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelera‐
tor, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 539 (2011).
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important companies whose assets consist of large bundles of financial
contracts.119 Without the protection of an automatic stay, these compa‐
nies are torn apart when they become insolvent. Recall Lehman Broth‐
ers: It was party to about 1.5 million transactions with over 8,000 coun‐
terparties when it filed for Chapter 11. Less than two weeks later, eighty
percent of those transactions had been liquidated.120 When an institution
like Lehman is torn apart, markets can destabilize. As the institution de‐
faults on millions of contracts with thousands of creditors, counterpar‐
ties and creditors may too suffer distress and fail (as the Primary Re‐
serve Fund did after Lehman’s collapse). And as thousands of counter‐
parties rush to sell collateral and rehedge positions that were exposed
by the institution’s default, market prices will experience wild swings in
value. These gyrations, of course, may severely undermine investor con‐
fidence, as we saw in “flight to quality” after the Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy and AIG bailout.
In this setting, the ordinary bankruptcy rule for QFCs—exempting
them from the automatic stay—is no longer attractive. While we do not
want to permit cherry‐picking, value exists in the various bundles of
contracts that may be impossible to recreate in times of severe economic
distress. Title II creates a regime that allows for an intermediate treat‐
ment of financial contracts that places them between ordinary executory
contracts and financial contracts in the typical Chapter 11. In this sense,
it does not turn its back on Chapter 11 as much as it creates a compro‐
mise between two positions that are already embedded in existing
bankruptcy law.
III. Will it Work?
One way to think about this question is to ask how Lehman Broth‐
ers would have benefited from Title II, were it on the books prior to
Lehman’s distress.121 Lehman found itself both heavily leveraged and
See generally Morrison, supra note 1.
Harvey Miller, Discussion at Sixth Annual Deals Roundtable, Columbia
Law School (Nov. 24, 2008).
121 The FDIC recently performed a similar thought experiment and envi‐
sioned a rapid receivership that merely consummated a sale (to Barclays) that
was hammered out during the five or six months preceding September 2008.
Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd‐Frank Act, 5
FDIC Quart. (forthcoming 2011). As many bloggers have already noted, the
119
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absolutely dependent upon short‐term credit markets. It had made large
bets on subprime residential real estate, commercial real estate, and
loans used to facilitate leveraged buyouts. When all three went sour, it
was hopelessly insolvent and, as soon as its sources of credit got wind of
this state of affairs, they cut it off. Lehman’s bankruptcy filing not only
made plain its own sorry condition, but also that of other large financial
institutions that were similarly leveraged and with similar wagers on
residential or commercial real estate or leveraged loans.
Laws by themselves can do little to fix this state of affairs.122 They
can do nothing to make an insolvent firm solvent or keep bad news
about others from leaking out. Dodd‐Frank does provide some liquid‐
ity. Limitations on the ability of the FDIC to extend credit may also un‐
dermine the ability of the Title II receivership to provide stability. As
noted earlier, the liquidation fund is capitalized by borrowings from the
Treasury and there is a strict cap on total borrowing per receivership.123
Regardless of whether the fear of bailouts justifies such limits, they
necessarily constrain the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC. Title II
applies only when there are systemic risks to the economy as a whole.
During the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government committed $8
trillion to the financial sector, essentially converting short‐term financ‐
ing of the largest financial institutions into long‐term financing.124 Ex
post, the cost to the taxpayer will likely be small, perhaps even less than
the cost of the savings and loan debacle of the 1990s. But the resources
deemed necessary far, far exceed the modest resources that Title II make
available to the FDIC.
FDIC report assumes (among other things) that the Corporation would have
been able to identify Lehman’s distress many months before its failure, muster
the political will to intervene prior to the firm’s collapse, obtain cooperation of
managers in investigating the firm’s options, investigate Lehman’s finances and
orchestrate an auction without sparking destabilizing rumors among financial
market participants, and secure cooperation from foreign financial officials.
Our analysis in this paper entertains the possibility that the FDIC receivership
might have been more complex and time‐consuming.
122 For a different version of the same argument, see DAVID SKEEL, THE
NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD‐FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 19–33 (2011).
123 See §210(n)(6).
124 See Comments of Jim Millstein, Education Session, American College of
Bankruptcy (March 19, 2011).
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The Lehman bankruptcy proved unusually complicated and hard
because its affairs were so tightly linked with its many off‐shore affili‐
ates. It underscored the way in which the affairs of giant banks tran‐
scend national borders and implicate many different and sometimes
competing regulatory regimes. The regulator of a related entity in an‐
other country will typically put a ring around that entity when a related
entity fails. This act alone can hugely disrupt the operations of a finan‐
cial institution that is completely dependent upon cash flowing con‐
tinuously throughout the entire system.
Title II, however, does little, if anything, to promote international
cooperation in the event of a financial meltdown. Section 202(f) calls for
a study “regarding international coordination.” In the meantime, Sec‐
tion 210(a)(1)(N) exhorts the FDIC to “cooperate, to the maximum extent
possible, with the appropriate foreign financial authorities regarding the
orderly liquidation of any covered financial company that has assets or
operations in a country other than the United States.” Without treaties
or other multilateral agreements, this exhortation offers little comfort.
One can also doubt the competence of government regulators to
handle the problems of a financial company that suddenly poses a sys‐
temic risk to the economy. The FDIC’s success in the past may derive in
large measure from its having regulated the failed bank closely in the
past and being already intimately familiar with its operation. The assets
consist largely of deposits that the FDIC has insured, and hence its own
money is at risk. Neither the FDIC nor any other government regulator
will be in a similar position if a toxic hedge fund appears in the next
meltdown.
To be sure, we live in a world of the second best. To say that the
FDIC will be badly equipped is not to say that anyone else will be better
equipped. Even so, we must be sanguine about the likely success of Title
II proceedings: If the Federal Reserve does an adequate job regulating
systemically important institutions under Title I of the Act, we will see
receiverships under Title II only when pervasive fraud or a seismic shift
in market conditions catch the Federal Reserve unawares (as the Great
Recession seems to have). These receiverships will be massively com‐
plex and deeply threatening to the economy (as were the failures of
Lehman and AIG). It is hard to be confident that any regulator will be
able to contain the fallout. Perhaps only another massive government
bailout will help.
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There is, however, one aspect of Lehman’s failure for which Title II
has something to offer that existing bankruptcy law does not. This con‐
cerns the treatment it provides for a systemically important financial
institution’s book of derivative trades.125 At the time of Lehman’s bank‐
ruptcy, its derivatives book as a whole appeared to be a net asset to the
estate worth tens of billions of dollars. Because of the way that the
Bankruptcy Code treats qualified financial contracts, this asset disap‐
peared in a puff of smoke the moment that bankruptcy was filed.
Moreover, Lehman’s derivative book was so large—consisting of
900,000 positions—that other players in the market had to rush to re‐
hedge their positions. This in turn destabilized prices. Unscrambling
and sorting out these transactions will likely take many years. Everyone
would have been better off if Lehman’s entire book of derivatives could
have been preserved. Because it was a net asset, in principle someone
would have been willing to pay a positive price to acquire it if it were an
asset that could have been sold.
Effecting the transfer of a derivatives book, however, will not be al‐
ways be easy when the systemically important institution is in distress.
It is one thing to contemplate assuming an entire derivatives book when
one can be confident that it is a net asset, which may well have been the
case in Lehman. But it will be much harder in cases in which the book is
a net liability or simply too hard to assess, as was likely the case in AIG.
Taking the entire book may not be an option, and evaluating tens or
hundreds of thousands of open contracts and picking and choosing
among the various counterparties simply will not be possible within the
two‐day window of Dodd‐Frank. Moreover, only by assuming the en‐
tire book does one minimize disruptions to counterparties. (If an entire
book is assumed or transferred, the receivership becomes completely
transparent to counterparties. They have same positions afterwards as
before.)
Of course, allowing entire positions to be transferred does not itself
require replacing the Bankruptcy Code with another regime. Indeed,
one could imagine importing Title II’s provisions on qualified financial
contracts into Chapter 11. This does not mean that Title II is bad, as it
For background on Lehman’s derivatives book, see Report of Anton R.
Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., vol. 2, at 568‐83,
Chapter 11 Case No. 08‐13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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suggests that its most obvious purpose is much narrower and more
modest than commonly supposed.
Whether Title II can serve a broader purpose may be doubted. The
goal of Title II is to provide a stabilizing force when systemic institu‐
tions crater, but several features undermine that goal. It is not obvious
that Title II will even provide certainty to any creditors. Creditors are
entitled to a minimum recovery equal to what they would have received
if both (i) the institution had been liquidated under Chapter 7 and (ii)
the FDIC had not been appointed as receiver.126 But the FDIC is ap‐
pointed as receiver only if the institution’s failure “would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.”127 Thus, to de‐
termine the minimum recovery to creditors, we must imagine the liqui‐
dation value of the institution in an economy that is suffering an eco‐
nomic collapse. That liquidation value is likely to be close to zero.
The minimum recovery is particularly uncertain for creditors with
rights of setoff. The legislation permits the FDIC to sell assets, free and
clear of rights of setoff.128 Affected creditors receive minimal compensa‐
tion in the form of priority above general unsecured claims, but below
administrative claims and certain other high‐priority unsecured claims
(e.g., wage claims of ordinary employees).
Creditors can, of course, receive more than this minimum recovery if
the FDIC determines that a higher recovery is necessary to maximize the
value of the institution’s assets or facilitate continued operations.129 But
these higher recoveries may eventually be clawed back by the FDIC.
Again, the legislation mandates that the Title II receivership be self‐
funding or at least not publicly funded. Section 210(o) allows the FDIC
to impose “assessments” on claimants to the extent that they received
amounts greater than “the value the claimant was entitled to receive
from the Corporation on such claim solely from the proceeds of the liq‐
uidation of the covered financial company under this title.”130 It is un‐
§210(d)(2),(3)
§203(b)(2).
128 §210(a)(12)(F).
129 See §210(b)(4), (d)(4), (h)(5)(E).
130 §210(o)(1)(D)(i). Some Creditors are not vulnerable to assessment. The
FDIC cannot claw back payments that were “necessary to initiate and continue
operations essential to implementation of the receivership or any bridge finan‐
cial company.” §210(o)(1)(D)(i). See Interim Rules, 12 CFR Part 38, p. 4212 (Jan.
25, 2011) (“A possible example of payments not subject to the ‘‘claw‐back’’ pro‐
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clear whether “proceeds of the liquidation of the covered financial com‐
pany under this title” is equivalent to the minimum payment guaran‐
teed to unsecured creditors described above.
That particular creditors receive nothing in the event of a Title II re‐
ceivership is not necessarily a problem per se, but the ambition of the
law and the justification for government intervention in the first in‐
stance is to provide stability when the failure of the company threatens
the United States economy as a whole. If payments are uncertain and if
it is not clear that payments can be kept even after they are made, one
can question how much stability the law in fact provides.
A common complaint against Title II—that it puts government regu‐
lators to solve a problem that existing bankruptcy law or a new chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code might solve—may miss the point. To a large
extent, Title II is consistent with the basic principles of bankruptcy law.
The terminology is different, but this is not a matter of substance. Its ba‐
sic features and ambitions are the same. The striking differences—the
eligibility rules, the minimal judicial involvement, and the consolidation
of many different roles in a single government regulator—derive from
its underlying premise. A Title II receivership can begin only when pri‐
vate solutions and ordinary judicial processes fail and it does provide a
resource that existing law lacks.
In short, Title II, like the Bankruptcy Code, provides a safety net.
The argument against it may be not so much that this safety net is likely
a modest one. Additional safety nets, however modest, would seem to
be things. One can take the view that working without a safety net
might be a good thing. People tend to be much more careful when there
is no safety net in place at all, poor or not. The absence of a safety net
concentrates the mind wonderfully. Cooler heads may have prevailed in
the case of LTCM and held its derivatives book together precisely be‐
cause there was no one for the investment banks to fall back on. There
was nothing analogous to Title II to come to the rescue of LTCM if they
did not. But this line of reasoning assumes that the relevant actors will
visions might be payments to trade creditors, such as a payment necessary to
ensure that a vendor is able to continue to provide the failed company with
essential software or hardware that could not be replicated, or payments to a
utility with a local monopoly.”). In other words, “critical vendors” avoid claw‐
back. Additionally, if proceeds from liquidation of a covered financial company
are sufficient to repay any funds received from the Treasury, the FDIC will not
exercise its clawback authority. §210(o)(1)(B).
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act rationally when left to fend for themselves. This path contains risk as
well.

